



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

RESEARCH AND
ENGINEERING

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(DDTE)

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AFOTEC/OTD Relations

Over the past year the working relationship between AFOTEC and OTD has steadily deteriorated. This deterioration has been manifest in several ways; AFOTEC refusal to coordinate on OTD's final report on countermeasure testing of IIR Maverick, AFOTEC refusal to include CM testing in the forthcoming FOT&E on IIR Maverick, AFOTEC withdrawing test assets previously promised for IIR GBU-15 CM testing, AFOTEC removing OTD from the TEMP coordination process, plus a host of other actions which, when considered as a whole, indicate a desire by AFOTEC to thwart or eliminate OTD's countermeasure tests during or in conjunction with AFOTEC operational tests. In an attempt to reverse this trend and rekindle the spirit of cooperation between these two agencies, we asked General Phillips to meet with General Hall on January 16, 1984, and reach some agreement on the Maverick test report, as well as future countermeasure tests on Maverick, IIR GBU-15, LANTIRN, and LLLGB. We had hoped that Mr. Dennis Kasperek, Director of OTD would also be present; however, Mr. Kasperek was on an urgent special assignment for Dr. Wade.

General Phillips arrived prepared to discuss in great detail why there is, in his opinion, no need for further countermeasure tests on Maverick. To support his argument, he brought members of his staff, Colonel Cairns and Major Beavers as well as Colonel Tom Ferguson, the AFSC Program Manager and his Chief Engineer, LtColonel Maddon. Additional support was provided General Phillips by two representatives from Hughes Aircraft Co., the Maverick prime contractor. The contractor reps were Mr. Barry Abrahams, Manager of Maverick programs, and Mr. Russ Smith, who recently resigned his position as a senior engineer on Colonel Ferguson's staff and has now taken employment with Hughes.

The combined team of AFOTEC, the SPO and the contractor presented a very strong, united case that the plethora of changes to the production version of IIR Maverick will have no effect on the missile's performance in a countermeasure environment and there is therefore no good reason for OTD to do any more testing. A more general argument was made by General Phillips


that AFOTEC should take over all testing and reporting of countermeasures susceptibilities, using "OTD talents" only as a subordinate element of AFOTEC's test team. The overwhelming impression was that General Phillips would do anything in his power to squelch the adverse test results in the pending OTD report on Maverick, and to thwart OTD CM testing efforts in the other programs (IR GBU-15, LLLGB, and LANTIRN).

Nothing was resolved at this meeting and unfortunately most of the time was spent discussing the Maverick situation. Consequently, a second meeting was held later in the day between Colonel Burton, DDT&E; and Colonel Cairns and Major Beavers of AFOTEC to discuss the status of cooperation in IIR GBU-15, LANTIRN and LLLGB. After some two hours of dialogue, AFOTEC pledged more cooperation and support to OTD on all programs; however, the overwhelming impression given was that they would rather not.


When pressed to explain why the AFOTEC/OTD situation has deteriorated, both General Phillips and his staff respond in no uncertain terms that they are fearful that OTD's test results and reports will be misinterpreted and used by critics to place Maverick, LANTIRN, and other programs in jeopardy. Colonel Cairns was asked directly, "Why are you objecting to the OTD draft report on Maverick?" His response was, "The report gives the impression that we should not buy Maverick and that is the wrong answer." This is the same response given to us a month ago when we asked AFOTEC for the actual mission by mission test results on GBU-15 and LLLGB so we could brief the Defense Science Board on delivery accuracies of certain guided munitions. AFOTEC refused to provide the data because they were afraid we and the DSB would "misinterpret the data and draw the wrong conclusions."

General Phillips and his staff openly state that Maverick, LANTIRN, IR GBU-15 and LLLGB are needed capabilities and must be transitioned into the inventory as quickly and as smoothly as possible. This is a very revealing insight. AFOTEC was established some ten years ago to be the objective, independent tester (that is, independent of the development community). General Phillips and his staff claim to be just that, objective and independent, yet their behavior in this matter (close relationship with AFSC Program Manager and contractors, attempts to suppress possible bad news while emphasizing the good news on test results) indicate that they are in fact advocates. Thus we have a serious mismatch between what AFOTEC claims to be and what their behavior suggests they actually are. It is therefore imperative that OTD be permitted to conduct CM tests as needed and report the results independently.

It is also imperative that the notion of objectivity be preserved in future decisions on these four systems. To that end, OSD must insist upon access to all test data generated by AFOTEC (as opposed to relying on published reports and coordinated briefings), including on-site observers, so that all relevant strengths and weaknesses are identified and considered.



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B. H. LIDDELL HART -- "STRATEGY" -- 1967

Strategic/Tactical Maxims

His Orientation

- Personal Experiences with WWI trench warfare
- Study of Great Captains and their Campaigns
- Study of Great Theorists and their ideas

- Adjust your end to your means. It is folly to bite off more than you can chew...
- Keep your object always in mind, while adapting your plan to circumstances.
- Choose the line (or course) of least expectation.
- Exploit the line of least resistance.
- Take a line of operations which offers alternative objectives. ...thus put your opponent on the horns of a dilemma...
- Ensure that both plan and dispositions are... adaptable to circumstances. Your dispositions (formation) should be such as to allow... adaptation in the shortest possible time.
- Do not throw your weight into a stroke whilst your opponent...is well placed to parry or evade it.
- Do not renew an attack along the same line (or in the same form) after it has once failed.

AIM

Avoid a massive bloodbath and avoid widespread destruction, yet achieve victory, by adhering to the strength against weakness philosophy embodied in the above maxims.

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